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ABSTRACT 
  The age of child sexual abuse victims and the private nature of sex crimes 
make it notoriously difficult for prosecutors to find sufficient admissible 
corroborating evidence for an effective prosecution. The Alaska courts have 
responded by stretching various codified and common-law hearsay rule 
exceptions to accommodate child-hearsay statements. In this Note, the Author 
discusses the inadequacies of this approach and proposes amending the Alaska 
Rules of Evidence to include a consistent hearsay exception for child-hearsay 
in sexual abuse cases, based on the first complaint rule and compliant with 
the Supreme Court’s articulation of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford 
v. Washington and Davis v. Washington. 
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Despite concerted efforts over the last twenty years to reduce its 
frequency, child sexual abuse continues to represent a grave threat to 
Alaska’s children. In 2009, more than one hundred cases of child sexual 
abuse were substantiated in Alaska.1 That statistic represents only a 
fraction of all actual incidents of child abuse, diminished by the fact that 
fear, and in many cases love, prevent more than ninety percent of 
incidents from being reported to the police.2 Although child abuse is an 
intensely private crime, its direct and indirect costs are openly borne by 
the victim, his or her family, and society as a whole. Victims often 
require substantial mental health assistance and are much more likely to 
suffer from at least one psychological disorder.3 In the long term, sexual 
abuse makes its victims more likely to abuse drugs or alcohol, spend 
time in prison, and experience teen pregnancy.4 
 
 1. Statistics on Child Abuse: Family Service Child Reports of Harm by 
Region, Federal Fiscal Year 2006, http://www.ridalaskaofchildabuse.org (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
 2. See Irving Prager, Sexual Psychotherapy and Child Molestors: The Experiment 
Fails, 6 J. JUV. L. 49, 72 (1982) (stating that “more than ninety percent of all child 
molestations apparently go unreported”). 
 3. Childhelp, National Child Abuse Statistics, http://www.childhelp.org/ 
resources/learning-center/statistics (last visited Apr. 10, 2010); see also National 
Center for PTSD, Child Sexual Abuse, http://www.ptsd.va.gov/public/pages/ 
child-sexual-abuse.asp (last visited Apr. 10, 2010). 
 4. Id. 
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Detecting sexual abuse and prosecuting its perpetrators is 
notoriously difficult. For a variety of reasons, sexual abuse is both 
underdisclosed and underreported.5 The difficulty of charging and 
prosecuting an abuser is enhanced by the lack of witnesses beyond the 
child, the lack of corroborating physical evidence, and the reluctance or 
inability of the victim to testify against the perpetrator.6 
The difficulties and costs of abuse must not cause us to forget the 
rights of alleged abusers. Child sexual abuse is a heinous crime, but 
alleged offenders must be provided the same Due Process rights as any 
other defendant. In particular, the Sixth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution guarantees defendants the opportunity to confront 
any witness against them through rigorous cross-examination. 
In an effort to resolve the many difficulties of prosecuting child 
abusers, prosecutors and courts have attempted to admit as evidence 
out-of-court allegations of abuse made by victims to third parties. These 
statements would normally be inadmissible hearsay under the Alaska 
Rules of Evidence, but courts have admitted them under various 
exceptions to the rules.7 Out of necessity and the widespread belief that 
children are unlikely to lie about sexual abuse, courts have stretched 
these exceptions to allow admission even when statements otherwise 
fail to meet any exception’s general requirements. For example, courts 
have admitted statements made long after an abusive event through the 
“excited utterance” exception.8 This approach, uneven at best, is 
inadequate to draw the necessary balance between admitting child-
hearsay statements and protecting defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights 
after the United States Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Crawford v. 
Washington9 and Davis v. Washington.10 
This Note explores the application of Alaska’s Rules of Evidence to 
child-victims’ out-of-court statements and recommends a change that 
 
 5. See Prager, supra note 2, at 72. 
 6. David Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in the 
Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977, 1008 (1969). 
 7. Numerous exceptions have been applied in child sexual abuse cases 
including: ALASKA R. EVID. 801(a) (Prior Inconsistent Statements); ALASKA R. 
EVID. 801(b) (Prior Consistent Statements); ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(3) (Recorded 
Statement by Child Victims of Crime); ALASKA R. EVID. 803(2) (Excited 
Utterances); ALASKA R. EVID. 803(23) (Residual Exception). 
 8. Smith v. State, 252 A.2d 277, 278–79 (Md. Ct. App. 1969) (admitting the 
hearsay statement of a four-year-old rape victim although the statement was 
made four to five hours after the assault, and the court found the child had been 
calm at the hospital for several hours before making the statement). 
 9. 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (defining a new approach to the confrontation clause 
based upon whether statements are testimonial in nature). 
 10. 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (clarifying the term “testimonial” by announcing an 
objective “primary purpose” test to evaluate police interrogations). 
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would enable courts to admit child-hearsay statements more freely 
when they comply with the Confrontation Clause. Part I explains the 
unique nature of child abuse prosecutions and why the hearsay 
testimony they often rely upon is generally both reliable and necessary. 
Part II discusses the reinvigorated Confrontation Clause and how 
admitted statements must comply with defendants’ constitutional 
rights. Part III describes the current approach of Alaska courts for 
admitting child-hearsay in sexual abuse cases. Part IV suggests a 
statutory amendment to the Alaska Rules of Evidence for evaluating 
child-hearsay statements in a consistent fashion, based upon the first 
complaint rule. This proposed exception would strike the important 
balance of admitting statements even when a declarant is unavailable, 
while still complying with the new requirements set forth in the 
Crawford and Davis decisions. Given the special circumstances of child 
abuse, this more certain hearsay exception for statements of child sexual 
abuse victims would provide needed direction, consistency, and fairness 
in prosecutions, and protect vulnerable child witnesses. 
I.  THE UNIQUE NATURE OF CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS 
Questions about the admission of out-of-court statements are not 
unique to cases involving children, but “there are perhaps no other cases 
in which these questions arise so regularly and are imbued with such 
urgent significance.”11 Additionally, detecting and prosecuting sex 
offenders is notoriously difficult, “in large part because there often are 
no witnesses except the victim.”12 
A.  Difficulties Faced in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions 
The difficulty in prosecuting child sexual abuse cases arises 
partially because sexual abuse is such an intensely private crime. Often 
no one except the accused and the victim are present when the abuse 
takes place, and in many cases the abuser is a parent, relative, or trusted 
acquaintance of the child.13 This private nature ensures that abuse is 
 
 11. Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
 12. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987). 
 13. GOVERNOR’S REPORT TO THE IDAHO LEGISLATURE: PROSECUTION OF CHILD 
SEXUAL ABUSE, JULY 1, 2006—JUNE 30, 2007 at 22 (Jan. 2008), available at http:// 
www2.state.id.us/ag/sexual_prosecution_reports/2007IdahoProsecutionOfChil
dSexualAbuseReport.pdf [hereinafter GOVERNOR’S REPORT] (illustrating a study 
that found that eighty-six percent of abusers were family members, friends, or 
acquaintances of their victims). 
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both underdisclosed and underreported.14 Child victims often 
experience low self-esteem, guilt, isolation, depression, embarrassment, 
and feelings of inadequacy.15 These feelings lead to a reticence to tell 
anyone about the abuse, and a tendency for children to feel responsible 
for and blame themselves for its occurrence.16 These and other traits of 
victimization make children unwilling, and in some cases unable, to 
answer the detailed questions relating to the abuse that police and 
prosecutors necessarily require.17 In cases where a child is old enough to 
understand the consequences of his or her decision to talk, the child may 
be forced to choose between the abuse and losing a parent or step-parent 
because of the abuse.18 
Even when a child chooses to tell someone about the abuse, it is 
often difficult for police and prosecutors to find admissible evidence to 
corroborate the victim’s claims. Many sex crimes do not involve physical 
penetration or contact that leaves physical marks such as bruises; 
instead, abuse takes the form of petting, fondling, or exhibitionism.19 
These less violent methods of abuse can be perpetrated without leaving 
obvious physical evidence, and even when children are examined by 
medical professionals, no certain conclusions can be drawn. This often 
leaves prosecutors with precious little evidence outside of the children’s 
statements to support accusations of child abuse.20 
When sufficient evidence is found and an alleged abuser is 
charged, the prosecution can be further hindered because children are 
often unable to tell their stories at trial. Victims are often too young to be 
competent witnesses or unable to cope with the trauma of being in a 
courtroom and facing their accuser, so they are declared unavailable.21 
Even when they are able to testify, child-victims are often 
“unsophisticated,” “inarticulate,” and “emotionally torn by the 
experience.”22 As witnesses, children are “impressionable, readily 
confused, and incapable of furnishing any detailed verbal account of 
[an] offense.”23 Beyond these weaknesses, children sometimes retract 
 
 14. See Prager, supra note 2, at 72. 
 15. Christopher Bagley, Development of an Adolescent Stress Scale For Use of 
School Counselors, 13 SCH. PSYCHOL. INT’L 31, 49 (1992). 
 16. Barbara Brooks Johnson, Sexual Abuse Prevention: A Rural Interdisciplinary 
Effort, 66 CHILD WELFARE 165, 165–67 (1987). 
 17. Lucy Berliner & Mary Kay Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of 
Sexual Assault, 40 J. SOC. ISSUES 125, 137 (1984). 
 18. Id. 
 19. GOVERNOR’S REPORT, supra note 13. 
 20. Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 55, 60 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
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true accusations of sexual abuse out of love, guilt, fear of reprisal, or fear 
that the offender will be sent to jail.24 
For jurors, child testimony about sexual abuse is often more 
traumatizing than valuable and is sometimes met with skepticism and 
disbelief.25 As the Alaska Court of Appeals stated in Nitz: 
Jurors are left with virtually no frame of reference for 
evaluating the credibility of the victim’s story, which is bound 
to seem, at one and the same time, too serious to be accepted 
uncritically and too shocking to be rejected lightly. Reliance on 
personal experience and common sense will be of little value to 
most jurors: because the victim is a child and sexual abuse of 
children is a subject alien to the experience of most jurors a 
realistic context for evaluating truthfulness will be difficult to 
find.26 
The private nature of sexual abuse, lack of corroborating evidence 
for children’s claims, and difficulties with child testimony indicate the 
need for hearsay statements in child sexual abuse prosecutions to be 
approached in a unique manner. To effectively prosecute child sexual 
abuse, prosecutors need more tools at their disposal. 
B. Using Victims’ Hearsay Statements in Child Sexual Abuse 
Prosecutions 
The use of hearsay statements made by child victims can alleviate 
many of the shortcomings described above. Section 801 of the Alaska 
Rules of Evidence defines hearsay as “statement[s], other than [those] 
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in 
evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”27 Hearsay statements 
are generally inadmissible under the Rules. The danger of this type of 
testimony is that its value rests upon the credibility of an out-of-court 
speaker whose memory, perception, narration, and sincerity cannot be 
tested by cross-examination.28 The law is explicit that hearsay is 
admitted only under codified exceptions contained in the Rules, or 
 
 24. Glen Skoler, New Hearsay Exceptions for a Child’s Statement of Sexual Abuse, 
18 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 6 (1984). 
 25. See Brown v. United States, 152 F.2d 138, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Fitzgerald 
v. United States, 443 A.2d 1295, 1299 (D.C. 1982). 
 26. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 60–61. 
 27. ALASKA R. EVID. 801(c). 
 28. 2 MCCORMICK’S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE §§ 245–246, at 583–84 
(Edward Cleary et al. eds., 1972) [hereinafter 2 MCCORMICK]. 
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through other exceptions “prescribed by the Alaska Supreme Court, or 
by enactment of the Alaska Legislature.”29 
Exceptions to the hearsay rule are generally allowed for two 
reasons: reliability and necessity. Some out-of-court statements are made 
with circumstantial guarantees of reliability that substitute for in-court 
guarantees like an oath and cross-examination.30 For example, a 
statement may be admitted as an excited utterance because it is made 
when the declarant is under the influence of a startling event and is 
therefore less likely to lie. Second, necessity sometimes justifies the use 
of hearsay evidence.31 For example, statements are admitted when a 
declarant is deceased or when the statements have unique evidentiary 
value that cannot be obtained from other sources.32 Section 803 of the 
Alaska Rules of Evidence contains a list of twenty-three codified 
exceptions to the general rule against hearsay.33 Additionally, some 
common-law exceptions to the rule against hearsay survived the 
adoption of the Alaska Rules of Evidence and continue to be applied by 
Alaska courts.34 
Research shows that statements by victims of child sexual abuse are 
appropriately admitted under these exceptions.35 First, children’s 
statements are generally reliable.36 One study found that roughly ninety-
five percent of children’s accusations are accurate.37 Others show more 
generally that although children cannot provide descriptions of events 
in the same detail as adults, the information they do provide is just as 
 
 29. ALASKA R. EVID. 802. 
 30. 5 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1420, at 251 
(James H. Chadbourn ed. 1974) [hereinafter 5 WIGMORE] (noting that some 
hearsay is so reliable that cross-examination is a “work of supererogation”). 
 31. See FED R. EVID. Art. VIII advisory committee’s note (“[W]hen the choice 
is between evidence which is less than the best and no evidence at all, only clear 
folly would dictate an across-the-board policy of doing without.”). 
 32. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 30, at 253. 
 33. ALASKA R. EVID. 803(1)–(23). 
 34. Contreras v. State, 718 P.2d 129, 136 (Alaska 1986) (citing Greenway v. 
State, 626 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1980)) (noting that some common law evidence 
rules survived the adoption of the Alaska Rules of Evidence). 
 35. Gary Melton, Procedural Reforms to Protect Child Witnesses in Sex Offense 
Proceedings, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE AND THE LAW: A REPORT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL 
RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY & PROTECTION, A.B.A. 184 (Josephine 
Bulkley ed., 1982). 
 36. Lucy Berliner & Mary Kay Barbieri, The Testimony of the Child Victim of 
Sexual Assault, J. SOC. ISSUES 125, 127 (1984) (“[T]here is little or no evidence 
indicating that children’s reports are unreliable, and none at all to support the 
fear that children often make false accusations of sexual assault or 
misunderstand innocent behavior by adults.”). 
 37. Faye A. Silas, Would a Kid Lie: Probably Not, Studies Find, A.B.A. J., Feb. 
1985, at 17 (noting a study that found that roughly ninety-five percent of 
children’s accusations of sexual abuse were accurate). 
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accurate.38 Studies also show that children can remember as much or 
more than adults when they are familiar with the situation.39 In 
particular, children can develop a knowledge base for repeated 
experiences that become familiar to them.40 In situations of repeated 
sexual abuse, these findings imply that children’s memories of the abuse 
would likely improve as abuse is repeated and becomes more routine 
and familiar to them.41 
Second, research shows that children are unlikely to lie about being 
sexually abused. Generally, children do not have the necessary 
vocabulary or knowledge about sexual matters to lie about them.42 
Many do not even realize that what has happened to them is wrong,43 
and most are unlikely to promulgate a continuous lie to parents and 
authority figures for a substantial amount of time. Furthermore, studies 
show that children can separate fantasy from reality,44 and they are 
unlikely to fabricate accusations of sexual acts they know little about.45 
Finally, children’s out-of-court statements may be more accurate 
than in-court testimony. Children’s memories can fade rapidly, 
indicating that statements made closer to the time of the assault may be 
more reliable than in-court testimony.46 Studies show that cognitive and 
developmental limitations may restrain children’s ability to relate events 
 
 38. JON’A F. MEYER, INACCURACIES IN CHILDREN’S TESTIMONY: MEMORY, 
SUGGESTIBILITY, OR OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY? 15 (1997) (“The few items children 
provide on free recall tend to be highly accurate.”). 
 39. Michelle Chi, Knowledge Structures and Memory Development, CHILDREN’S 
THINKING: WHAT DEVELOPS? 73, 82 (Robert Siegler ed., 1978) (finding that young 
chess players are able to recall chess positions briefly presented to them better 
than adults unfamiliar with the game). 
 40. Stephen Lepore, Child Witness: Cognitive and Social Factors Related to 
Memory and Testimony, 3 ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE ACCUSATIONS 65, 83 (1990). 
 41. MEYER, supra note 38, at 13. 
 42. Janet Flammang, Interviewing Child Victims of Sex Offenders, THE SEXUAL 
VICTIMOTOLOGY OF YOUTH 175, 177 (Leroy G. Schultz ed., 1980). 
 43. Thomas W. McCahill et al., THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE 44 (1979) (“In many 
cases, the nature of the event (or events) is merely confusing. Whereas the event 
is disturbing to the victim, it is perhaps no more disturbing than so many other 
aspects of a child’s life.”). 
 44. See, e.g., Patricia Morison and Howard Gardner, Dragons and Dinosaurs: 
The Child’s Capacity to Differentiate Fantasy from Reality, 49 CHILD DEV. 642, 645 
(1978) (reporting that elementary school students could differentiate between 
real and fantastic images). 
 45. Marcia K. Johnson & Mary Ann Foley, Differentiating Fact from Fantasy: 
The Reliability of Children’s Memory, 33 J. SOC. ISSUES 33, 45 (1984); see also Kathleen 
Faller, Is the Child Victim of Sexual Abuse Telling the Truth?, 8 CHILD ABUSE & 
NEGLECT 471, 475 (1984) (asserting that children will not make up stories because 
it is not “in their interests” to do so and many children lack the requisite sexual 
knowledge to convince an adult they have been victimized). 
 46. A. DANIEL YARMEY, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY 204–05 
(1979). 
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under pressure.47 Requiring a child-victim to testify in a sexual abuse 
case often creates stress that could adversely affect the child’s perception 
and memory.48 The stress of testifying is intensified by the fact that most 
child-victims know their abuser as a relative or friend and must face him 
or her in the courtroom.49 
The use of hearsay testimony is more appropriate in child sexual 
abuse cases than in many other criminal cases. Children’s out-of-court 
statements are generally reliable because children lack the knowledge 
and vocabulary necessary to fabricate stories of sexual abuse and lack 
the motive to lie about the incident in a free-recall situation; 
furthermore, they are not subject to the stress and possible manipulation 
of testifying against a loved one in court when making the out-of-court 
statements. These statements can be a powerful tool to help alleviate 
many of the problems prosecutors have in corroborating allegations of 
child sexual abuse. 
II.  THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND ITS APPLICATION TO 
CHILD-HEARSAY STATEMENTS UNDER ALASKA LAW 
Abuse cases too often end up as a swearing contest between a child 
victim and an abuser maintaining his innocence. When much of a case 
hinges on the testimony and credibility of a child, it is unfair to allow too 
much testimony “through a parade of articulate, experienced, adult 
witnesses who impart to the child’s statements the mature eloquence of 
adulthood and a sense of their own credibility, while adding nothing of 
substance but the force of repetition.”50 This is particularly true when 
victims are found unavailable to testify and the defendant is unable to 
confront his accuser. 
Courts must be careful in sexual abuse cases to protect defendants’ 
constitutional rights.51 The Sixth Amendment mandates, “In criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with 
the witnesses against him.”52 The clause is applied to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment53 and is applicable when the state offers 
 
 47. Id. 
 48. Cf. id. at 208–09 (citing a study that showed children were adversely 
affected by the pressure of making identifications from lineups, in contrast to 
identifications made from slides). 
 49. GOVERNOR’S REPORT, supra note 13, at 22. 
 50. Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 55, 61 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
 51. Id. 
 52. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 53. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (holding that the Confrontation 
Clause was incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and therefore binding on the states). 
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otherwise admissible hearsay against a criminal defendant. A literal 
reading of the Confrontation Clause would bar the admission of all 
hearsay evidence, but the Supreme Court has not interpreted the clause 
this way.54 However, the clause places significant limits on the use of 
hearsay evidence by generally requiring the declarant to testify and be 
cross-examined.55 The requirements of the Sixth Amendment reflect the 
longstanding belief that face-to-face confrontation at trial enhances the 
truth-finding process by allowing the jury the best opportunity to judge 
the credibility of the witness under oath.56 
A. The Confrontation Clause’s Evolution from the Adequate Indicia 
of Reliability Approach to the Testimonial Statement Approach 
Recent decisions have dramatically altered the application of the 
Confrontation Clause to hearsay statements. For nearly a quarter of a 
century, courts viewed statements under the criteria set forth in Roberts 
v. Ohio.57 Roberts held that, to be admissible under the Confrontation 
Clause, hearsay statements had to be “necessary” and “reliable.”58 
“Necessity” required that the prosecution “produce, or demonstrate the 
unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use against 
the defendant.”59 “Reliability” required that the statement be admissible 
only under a firmly-rooted exception to the hearsay rule or where 
evidence existed showing particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.60 
Unless the evidence fit within a “firmly rooted hearsay exception,” or 
 
 54. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895) (holding that the general 
prohibition against hearsay evidence must “occasionally give way to 
considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case”); see also 
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
 55. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406–07; Mattox, 156 U.S. at 242–43. 
 56. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 30, § 1420 (“The theory of the hearsay rule . . . is 
that the many possible sources of inaccuracy and untrustworthiness which may 
lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness can best be brought to 
light and exposed, if they exist, by the test of cross-examination. But this test or 
security may in a given instance be superfluous; it may be sufficiently clear, in 
that instance, that the statement offered is free enough from the risk of 
inaccuracy and untrustworthiness, so that the test of cross-examination would 
be a work of supererogation.”). 
 57. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Roberts and its progeny defined Confrontation Clause 
rights from 1980 until the Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 
(2004). 
 58. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65–66. 
 59. Id. at 65. 
 60. Id. at 65–66. 
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the defendant had a prior chance to cross-examine the witness,61 the 
testimony had to be excluded.62 
In Crawford v. Washington,63 the Court altered the paradigm for 
Confrontation Clause analysis and ostensibly overruled Roberts.64 Justice 
Scalia, speaking for the Court, held that the “firmly rooted hearsay 
exception[s]” or “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” under 
Roberts were not enough to protect defendants’ Confrontation Clause 
rights.65 Instead, the Court held that the Confrontation Clause would bar 
the admission of all “testimonial statements” unless the declarant was 
available as a witness or the defendant had prior opportunity to cross-
examine him.66 The Court defined “testimony” as “a solemn declaration 
or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing or proving some 
fact,” 67 and noted by example that “an accuser making a statement to 
government officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes 
a casual, offhand remark to an acquaintance cannot.”68 Some statements 
qualify as testimonial under any definition of testimonial, such as ex 
parte testimony at a preliminary hearing.69 However, the Court refused 
to more thoroughly define “testimonial.”70 
In the Court’s consolidated decision in Davis v. Washington and 
Hammon v. Indiana,71 Justice Scalia returned to the task of defining 
“testimonial” and set out an “objective” test: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of 
police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating 
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial 
when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency and that the primary purpose is to 
 
 61. Id. at 66. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 64. Id. at 74 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (“In choosing the path it does, the 
Court of course overrules Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), a case decided 
nearly a quarter of a century ago.”); see also Valdivia v. Schwarzenegger, 548 F. 
Supp. 2d 852, 862 (E.D. Cal. 2008) (noting that Crawford completely overturned 
Roberts but that Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990), was only partially 
overturned). 
 65. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60. 
 66. Id. at 53–54. 
 67. Id. at 51 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE 
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 52. 
 70. Id. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a 
comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’”). 
 71. 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
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establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.72 
In Davis, the Court distinguished two sets of statements according 
to this “primary purpose” test. It found statements made by the victim 
during a 911 call to be non-testimonial, even though they accused the 
defendant and described an assault.73 The Court reasoned that the 
statements were made during an ongoing emergency, and that the 
operator’s questions were designed to enable police assistance and not 
to investigate the crime.74 Another set of statements, made by a victim in 
response to police questioning shortly after an assault, were found to be 
testimonial because the purpose of the questioning was to investigate a 
crime in preparation for filing charges.75 
The Davis decision left important questions unanswered. The Court 
declined to establish a bright line rule regarding what statements are 
considered “testimonial” or “interrogatory” or explicitly state whose 
purpose (i.e., the questioner or the responder) is most relevant in 
determining whether a statement is testimonial.76 Importantly, Crawford 
and Davis involved statements made to police officers, who are typically 
not the recipients of the first complaint in child abuse cases. It is not yet 
clear whether statements made to private parties can be considered 
testimonial.77 
B. Application of the Confrontation Clause to Child Abuse Cases 
The Supreme Court has given very few reference points for 
examining the renewed Confrontation Clause’s effect on child hearsay 
statements. In Crawford, the Court referred to White v. Illinois.78 In that 
 
 72. Id. at 822. 
 73. Id. at 827. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 828. 
 76. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 615 (2d ed. 2008). 
 77. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 n.2 (2006) (conceding that the 
analysis did not reach the question of “whether and when statements made to 
someone other than law enforcement personnel are ‘testimonial’”); see also 
Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to Confrontation: 
“A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L. J. 917, 920–43 (2007). Professor 
Mosteller makes reference to White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992); Idaho v. Wright, 
497 U.S. 805 (1990); and The King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. (1779) as reference 
points in applying the Davis/Crawford paradigm to hearsay in child abuse cases. 
 78. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004) (“One case arguably 
in tension with the rule requiring a prior opportunity for cross-examination 
when the proffered statement is testimonial is White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 
(1992), which involved, inter alia, statements of a child victim to an investigating 
police officer admitted as spontaneous declarations.”). 
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case, the trial court admitted hearsay statements made by a child sexual 
abuse victim to a babysitter, mother, police officer, nurse, and doctor 
under various hearsay exceptions.79 The Court affirmed admission of the 
statements under the “excited utterance” and “statement to medical 
professional” exceptions to the hearsay rule, finding that those 
exceptions were firmly rooted and that therefore the testimony was 
independently reliable.80 Justice Scalia’s reference in Crawford indicates 
that the victim’s statements to the police officer likely conflicted with the 
Confrontation Clause.81 Interestingly, Scalia made no reference to the 
testimony of the babysitter, mother, nurse, and doctor.82 This explicit 
reference to the police officer’s statements, while not identifying the 
statements made to the parent, babysitter, nurse and doctor as 
testimonial, offers a guidepost in interpreting the clause in child sex- 
abuse cases.83 
Allowing the testimony of private parties in child sexual abuse 
cases makes sense under the objective test set forth in Davis. When a 
parent, babysitter or doctor asks a child what is bothering him or what 
caused certain injuries, the primary purpose of the questioning is not to 
“establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.”84 Instead, the point of the questioning is almost always to 
solve the problem; in other words, to enable “assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.”85 Because of the tremendous risks associated with 
child sexual abuse and its nefarious and private nature, even if a child is 
not in immediate danger when questioned, the situation might be 
considered an emergency for Confrontation Clause purposes. 
In applying Crawford and Davis, appellate courts have used the 
White guidepost and the Davis criteria to determine if hearsay statements 
are testimonial. Their analysis has included examining the identity of a 
questioner and her relationship to the State, the purpose of the 
questioning, the knowledge or belief of the child as to the future use of 
the child’s statements, and the situation’s formality and relationship to 
law enforcement.86 A victim’s statements to parents, family members, 
 
 79. 502 U.S. at 350–51. 
 80. Id. at 356. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Mosteller, supra note 77, at 942–44. 
 84. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006). 
 85. Id. 
 86. State v. Shafer, 128 P.3d 87 (Wash. 2006) (holding statements made to the 
victim’s mother and a family friend non-testimonial under these criteria), cert. 
denied sub nom. Shafer v. Washington, 549 U.S. 1019 (2006); see also State v. Hosty, 
944 So.2d 255, 261 (Fla. 2006) (holding statements made by a twenty-three-year-
old mentally handicapped sexual abuse victim to a teacher were not testimonial 
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and friends have generally been treated as non-testimonial.87 Statements 
to medical professionals who first examine a child after an incident are 
also generally treated as non-testimonial.88 Alternatively, statements to 
police officers are routinely classified as testimonial regardless of the age 
of the child or the formality of the circumstances involved.89 
In State v. Pantano,90 the Nevada Supreme Court drew an explicit 
contrast between statements made by children to their parents and 
statements made to police: 
A parent questioning his or her child regarding possible sexual 
abuse is inquiring into the health, safety, and well-being of the 
child. To characterize such parental questioning as the 
gathering of evidence for the purposes of litigation would 
unnecessarily and undesirably militate against a parent’s 
ability to support and nurture a child at a time when the child 
most needs that support. We therefore conclude that [the 
child’s] statements to her father were nontestimonial in 
nature.91 
 
but that statements made to a police officer were testimonial); In the Interest of 
N.D.C., 229 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Mo. 2007) (holding that statements to a child-
victim’s mother were admissible under Crawford). 
 87. State v. Coder, 968 A.2d 1175, 1186 (N.J. 2009) (holding a child-victim’s 
statements to her mother admissible as non-testimonial statements under the 
Crawford analysis); see also State v. Brigman, 615 S.E.2d 21, 23–24 (N.C. Ct. App. 
2005) (holding statements to a foster parent were non-testimonial); People v. 
Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 920–21 (Colo. 2006) (holding statements to the victim’s father 
and the father’s friend were non-testimonial). 
 88. United States v. Peneaux, 432 F.3d 882, 896 (8th Cir. 2005) (“Where 
statements are made to a physician seeking to give medical aid in the form of 
diagnosis or treatment, they are presumptively nontestimonial.”); see also People 
v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 218–20 (Cal. 2007) (holding statements made to a doctor in 
an emergency room were non-testimonial); Foley v. State, 914 So.2d 677, 685 
(Miss. 2005) (holding statements made as part of neutral medical evaluations did 
not meet Crawford’s “testimonial” criterion). 
 89. See, e.g., Cage, 155 P.3d at 210, 217–18 (holding statements made to police 
officers during an informal emergency room meeting were non-testimonial); 
State v. Grace, 111 P.2d 28, 31, 38 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005) (holding statements by a 
child victim to a police officer were non-testimonial). 
 90. 138 P.3d 477 (Nev. 2006). In Pantano, the child testified and was available 
for cross-examination; the court recognized that the Confrontation Clause was 
not violated regardless of whether the statement was testimonial, but addressed 
the issue because it wanted to clarify treatment of this class of statements. Id. at 
482. 
 91. Id. at 483. 
GOCHNOUR_FINAL.DOC 5/7/2010  5:33:08 PM 
2010 CHILD-HEARSAY STATEMENTS 85 
C. Alaska’s Application of Crawford and Davis 
The Alaska Court of Appeals has not directly addressed how the 
Confrontation Clause should be applied in sexual abuse cases; however, 
its decisions offer some guidance in addressing hearsay testimony after 
Crawford and Davis. First, the court has followed the distinction the 
Supreme Court drew in Crawford between statements made to 
government officials investigating a crime and statements made to 
friends or acquaintances.92 Since victims’ out-of-court statements are 
most often made to family members, medical personnel, or social 
workers, and not to police officers, this distinction carries special import. 
Second, the court has used an “entirety of the circumstances” 
analysis to apply the Davis “primary purpose” test. In Clark v. State,93 the 
court held that hearsay statements identifying the assailant in a physical 
abuse case did not violate the Confrontation Clause.94 The victim, 
Amouak, was allegedly beaten by her boyfriend, Clark.95 When she 
arrived at the hospital for treatment, Amouak told emergency room 
personnel that Clark had assaulted her.96 During trial, the State relied on 
medical records describing Amouak’s statements identifying Clark.97 
The court found that based on the entirety of the circumstances—
”the underlying events of the evening in question, plus the subsequent 
actions and statements of Amouak, the nurse, and the doctor”—it was 
objectively clear that the victim and medical personnel acted with the 
primary purpose of obtaining or providing medical care.98 This analysis 
corresponds with that of other courts, which have found statements 
made by children to parents, medical personnel, and social workers 
admissible under the primary purpose test.99 
Finally, even first complaints made to a police officer might be 
admissible when the statements were made to stop an ongoing 
emergency. In Anderson v. State,100 the court of appeals evaluated 
statements made by an assault victim to the police.101 When the officers 
arrived after the assault had ended, they were led to the victim, who 
was lying on the floor in the fetal position and had suffered life-
 
 92. Potterfield v. State, 145 P.3d 613, 614 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006). 
 93. 199 P.3d 1203 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009). 
 94. Id. at 1213. 
 95. Id. at 1205. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 1213. 
 99. See supra notes 88–89. 
 100. 163 P.3d 1000 (Alaska Ct. App. 2007). 
 101. Id. at 1001.  
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threatening injuries.102 When the officer asked the victim to describe 
“what happened,” the victim identified the assailant as Anderson, the 
man police had apprehended in the apartment’s other room.103 The court 
found the officer’s question was focused on determining the nature and 
extent of the injuries and the assistance that would be needed.104 
Furthermore, the officer initially knew only that someone had been hurt 
and not that a crime had been committed.105 Under these circumstances, 
the court held that the officer’s question and the victim’s statement had 
the primary purpose of ending the ongoing emergency and were 
therefore non-testimonial.106 
Under this analysis, in certain circumstances a child’s statement to 
a police officer about ongoing abuse may be admitted without offending 
a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights. Because of the secretive nature 
of sexual abuse and general absence of physical harm, only rarely will 
this be the case. However, in cases where a child is raped or sexually 
assaulted, this analysis shows that statements admissible under a 
hearsay exception may not violate the Confrontation Clause, even if 
made to police officers. 
III.  ADMITTING CHILD HEARSAY STATEMENTS UNDER THE 
ALASKA RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The reliability and necessity of hearsay evidence in sexual abuse 
trials has caused it to be admitted under a variety of codified and 
common-law exceptions in Alaska. A discussion of the currently used 
exceptions illustrates, however, the weaknesses of this ad-hoc approach 
and the necessity of a more systematic regime for admitting child-
hearsay statements. Such a regime could protect the rights of both 
children and defendants. This discussion is not meant to encompass all 
methods used to introduce hearsay testimony in sexual abuse cases, but 
rather to illustrate that the court’s and legislature’s current approach to 
child hearsay is inadequate, and to suggest a new hearsay exception that 
would recognize the unique reliability of child hearsay statements. 
 
 102. Id. at 1004. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 1005. 
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A. Excited Utterance Hearsay Exception 
One important way in which hearsay statements are admitted 
when a child abuse victim is unavailable as a witness is the “excited 
utterance” exception codified in the Alaska Rules of Evidence as Rule 
803(2).107 The rule is supported by the basic theory that certain 
circumstances “may produce a condition of excitement which 
temporarily stills the capacity of reflection and produces utterances free 
of fabrication.”108 Because such statements are inherently reliable, the 
availability of the declarant is immaterial. A declaration may be 
admitted as an excited utterance only when it is “sufficiently 
contemporaneous with the event” that it can be regarded as having been 
stimulated by the event and not by the declarant’s deliberation.109 
Declarations made after the shocking circumstances have faded are not 
admissible as excited utterances.110 
Alaska’s application of the excited utterance exception in child 
abuse cases has generally followed these principles. The Alaska 
Supreme Court announced the test for determining if a statement is an 
excited utterance in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Harvey:111 “Was the declaration 
spontaneous, excited, or impulsive, or was it the product of reflection 
and deliberation?”112 Application of the test has focused on whether 
there was opportunity for “reflection”113 or “reflective thought”114 before 
a statement was made. Courts have used the amount of time between an 
exciting event and a statement to determine whether there was 
opportunity for reflection. In Torres v. State,115 the Alaska Supreme Court 
admitted evidence of a child victim’s complaint to her mother as an 
excited utterance.116 Approximately five to ten minutes had elapsed 
between the assault and the young girl’s statement to her mother.117 The 
 
 107. ALASKA R. EVID. 803(2) (“A statement relating to a startling event or 
condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the 
event or condition.” (emphasis added)). 
 108. FED. R. EVID. 803(2) advisory committee’s note. 
 109. 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 288, at 226 (Charles E. Torcia ed., 14th 
ed. 1986). 
 110. Vandiver v. State, 726 P.2d 195, 198 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (“We recently 
recognized that, in order to qualify as an excited utterance, a statement must be 
made while under the stress of the event, and must not be the product of 
reflective thought.”). 
 111. 558 P.2d 879 (Alaska 1976). 
 112. Id. at 884. 
 113. Lipscomb v. State, 700 P.2d 1298, 1307 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985). 
 114. State v. Agoney, 608 P.2d 762, 764 (Alaska 1980). 
 115. 519 P.2d 788 (Alaska 1974). 
 116. Id. at 793. 
 117. Id. at 792. 
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court looked to the short period of elapsed time and evidence that the 
girl was “excited and emotionally upset” in reasoning that there had 
been little opportunity for deliberation or fabrication.118 In contrast, the 
Alaska Court of Appeals in Sluka v. State119 concluded that a child’s out-
of-court statements made nearly four hours after a physical assault did 
not qualify as excited utterances.120 The court reasoned that the length of 
time between the attacks and the statements, and the dearth of evidence 
that the child had been “emotionally engulfed by the situation,” 
necessitated a denial of the exception.121 
The focus on spontaneity and the time between an assault and a 
statement fails to account for the unique circumstances surrounding 
child sexual abuse. According to the excited utterance rule, a child’s 
hearsay report must take place soon after an assault. This is inadequate 
in sexual abuse cases for several reasons.122 First, many children do not 
regard sexual abuse as shocking or even unusual.123 Often, children act 
normally because they do not know what child molestation is or 
understand why an abuser committed the act. Some children even view 
sexual incidents as expressions of warmth and affection.124 Dr. Alfred 
Kinsey described children’s view of sexuality this way: 
[C]hildren have only a dim sense of adult sexuality. What may 
seem like a horrible violation of social taboos from an adult 
perspective need not be so to a child. A sexual experience with 
an adult may be something unusual, vaguely unpleasant, even 
traumatic at the moment, but not a horror story. Most 
children’s sexual experiences involve encounters with fondlers 
and exhibitionists, . . . and it is difficult to understand why a 
child, except for its cultural conditioning, should be disturbed 
 
 118. Id. at 793. 
 119. 717 P.2d 394 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
 120. Id. at 398. 
 121. Id. The court also referenced the fact that the child’s statements had come 
as a response to questioning, a very common situation in child abuse cases. Id. 
While the court did not hold the amount of time that had elapsed, emotional 
state, or fact that the statement was a response to a question as dispositive, the 
totality of the circumstances indicated that the statements were not reliable 
enough to be excited utterances. Id. 
 122. See Judy Yun, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Hearsay Statements in 
Child Sex Abuse Cases, 1983 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1755 (1983) (discussing 
inadequacies of excited utterance exceptions for child-hearsay statements). 
 123. McCahill, supra note 43, at 44. 
 124. Kee MacFarlane, Sexual Abuse of Children, THE VICTIMIZATION OF WOMEN 
88–89 (Jane Chapman Roberts ed., 1978). 
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at having its genitals touched, or disturbed at seeing the 
genitals of other persons.125 
Second, children may make complaints long after a sexual act; 
hours, days, months,126 or even years127 may elapse before a child 
reports abuse. A delay can be caused by numerous factors, including 
feelings of confusion or guilt, fears of not being believed, efforts to 
forget, or threats made by the defendant to the victim.128 In many cases, 
a child will remain silent until circumstances compel him to recount the 
experience.129 
Because of these stark realities, courts in many jurisdictions have 
stretched the excited utterance exception beyond its traditional limits in 
order to admit hearsay testimony of child sexual abuse victims.130 These 
courts made decisions to avoid the harsh results of a strict hearsay 
exception that could destroy the prosecution’s entire case. Such a broad 
application of the exception destroys its integrity and leaves precedent 
that is inconsistent and difficult to follow. 
B. The Residual Exception 
Alaska’s courts have sometimes used the residual or “catch-all” 
hearsay exception131 in sexual abuse cases to admit child hearsay 
 
 125. ALFRED KINSEY, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN FEMALE 121 (1953). 
 126. See Greenway v. State, 626 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1980) (finding that a child 
victim did not report a rape for over one month after its commission). 
 127. See Emery v. State, No. A-7799, No. 4608, 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 198 
(Alaska Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2002). The victim, who had been abused for several 
years by her stepfather, did not go to authorities for more than two years after 
the last act of abuse. Id. at *5. The court allowed an expert witness to explain 
why a child often does not report child abuse immediately, especially against a 
family member. Id. 
 128. Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1061. 
 129. See, e.g., State v. Messamore, 639 P.2d 413, 416 (Haw. Ct. App. 1982). 
 130. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 252 A.2d 277, 278–79 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1969) 
(allowing the hearsay statement of a four-year-old rape victim although the 
statement was made four to five hours after the assault and the child had been 
calm at the hospital for several hours before the statement), State v. Noble, 342 
So.2d 170, 172–73 (La. 1977) (admitting as excited utterances statements of a 
four-year-old victim made two days after the rape), Haley v. State, 247 S.W.2d 
400, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952) (admitting as excited utterances statements of a 
child victim more than eight hours after a rape). 
 131. ALASKA R. EVID. 803(23); ALASKA R. EVID. 804(b)(5). These exceptions 
allow hearsay statements not covered by any other hearsay exception provided 
that the statement has “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” and 
provided that “(a) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (b) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other 
evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (c) 
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statements that cannot qualify under any other hearsay exception. In 
particular, this exception has been used when a declarant is unavailable 
but his statement cannot fit into the excited utterance exception. In 
Broderick v. Kings Way Assembly of God Church,132 the Alaska Supreme 
Court defined the residual exception’s requirements and emphasized its 
proper use.133 A young child told her mother that a church nursery 
worker had committed sexual abuse.134 At trial, the only identification of 
the alleged abuser came from testimony by the girl’s mother.135 The 
court’s analysis focused on whether the circumstances surrounding the 
child’s statement provided indicia of reliability equivalent to those of 
other hearsay exceptions.136 It held that the child’s testimony was 
inherently reliable based on her young age, childish terminology, 
consistency, and lack of motive to lie.137 These factors correspond to 
those used by courts in other jurisdictions to allow child abuse 
statements to be admitted under the residual hearsay exception.138 
Some commentators have advocated using the Broderick court’s 
application of the residual hearsay exception on a more generalized 
basis, in essence creating a hearsay exception for child abuse statements 
based on the criteria of the residual exception.139 The Broderick court, 
however, explicitly stated that while “the residual exception may 
sometimes be appropriate in the child abuse context,” it “does not create 
a new class exception to the hearsay rule.”140 
Although basing the introduction of children’s reports of sexual 
abuse on the residual hearsay exception might offer courts more 
flexibility, such an approach is inadequate for two reasons. First, as the 
court noted in Broderick, it would expand the rule beyond its limited 
intent.141 The exception was not intended to allow an entire class of 
hearsay statements to be admitted pursuant to its requirements.142 
 
the general purposes of these rules and interest of justices will best be served by 
admission of the statement into evidence.” ALASKA R. EVID. 803(23). 
 132. 808 P.2d 1211 (Alaska 1991). 
 133. Id. at 1218. The court noted the widespread use of the residual exception 
in other states and circuits. Id. at 1218 n.17. 
 134. Id. at 1214. 
 135. Id. at 1217. 
 136. Id. at 1219–20. 
 137. Id. 
 138. See, e.g., Bertrang v. State, 184 N.W.2d 867 (Wis. 1971). 
 139. NATIONAL LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER FOR CHILD ADVOCACY AND 
PROTECTION, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING 
LEGAL INTERVENTION IN INTRAFAMILY CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 35 (1982). 
 140. Broderick, 808 P.2d at 1218. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
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Instead, the rule was intended to be used rarely and only in special 
circumstances.143 
Second, some statements allowed under the residual exception 
would likely fail to meet the exacting standards of the Court’s 
reinvigorated Confrontation Clause. Statements by child victims to 
police and other agents of the state might meet the criteria of the 
residual exception, but would be classified as testimonial and prohibited 
by the Sixth Amendment. 
C. Medical Records Exception 
Hospital records, including statements made by patients about how 
their injuries occurred, are admissible under Section 803(4) of the Alaska 
Rules of Evidence. Although these statements are generally made in 
response to questions, the statements are viewed as highly reliable 
because patients believe that the quality of their medical care is 
contingent upon the accuracy of the information they give to their 
doctors.144 The exception admits statements made to all medical 
personnel—not only doctors—so long as the statement is related to 
diagnosis and treatment.145 The medical records exception is particularly 
useful in child sexual abuse cases because it does not require that the 
victim be available to testify. 
Alaska courts’ application of the medical records exception 
generally mirrors application of the federal exception. Evidence is 
admissible as long as it relates to the cause of the victim’s condition.146 A 
statement that assigns fault or identifies the assailant, however, is 
inadmissible.147 In Johnson v. State, the Alaska Supreme Court explained 
the distinction: “Since statements fixing fault and indicating the identity 
of an assailant are not relevant to medical diagnosis or treatment, they 
lack assurances of reliability and should be excluded.”148 
In the recent case of Clark v. State,149 the Alaska Court of Appeals 
applied the exception in evaluating the admissibility of an assault 
victim’s statements to her doctor regarding her injuries.150 The court 
 
 143. Id. 
 144. 2 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, PRACTITIONER 
TREATISE SERIES 246–47 (1992). 
 145. Id. at 248. 
 146. Johnson v. State, 579 P.2d 20, 22 (Alaska 1978) (holding statements that 
identified the victim’s attacker are inadmissible under the medical records 
exception). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. 199 P.3d 1203 (Alaska Ct. App. 2009). 
 150. Id. at 1205. 
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held as admissible evidence that the injuries were inflicted by another 
person, the manner they were inflicted, and the amount of force used by 
the perpetrator.151 The identity of the perpetrator, however, was 
inadmissible under Johnson.152 
The medical records exception will continue to be a valuable tool in 
prosecuting sex offenders; however, its use is still limited because the 
identity of the perpetrator is generally inadmissible under the exception. 
In some cases where a victim is unavailable to testify, his or her 
statement to medical personnel may be the only evidence that the child 
named the abuser. As with the excited utterance and residual hearsay 
exceptions, in this situation, courts are faced with a difficult decision 
between expanding an exception beyond its traditional form or allowing 
valuable evidence identifying an alleged abuser to slip away. 
D. Recorded Statement by Child Victims of Crime 
Section 801(d)(3) of the Alaska Rules of Evidence contains a special 
exception for recorded statements made by child sexual abuse victims. 
The exception allows recorded statements made prior to a trial to be 
shown to the jury, provided the defendant is available as a witness to be 
cross-examined.153 Exceptions like 801(d)(3) were enacted in many states 
during the 1980s in an attempt to solve issues surrounding children’s 
ability to testify in the courtroom.154 Prerecorded statements can also 
preserve child testimony from memory loss or recantation. 
Alaska’s statutory exception complied with the Confrontation 
Clause as it was then enforced under Roberts, by requiring that the 
victim be available for cross-examination. However, the exception still 
inadequately balances the rights of the accused with the special nature 
of child abuse testimony. Like the current application of the first 
complaint doctrine, the recorded statement exception requires that a 
victim be available for cross-examination. This means that a child’s 
statements are most likely to be prohibited in cases where they are most 
necessary.155 
 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. ALASKA R. EVID. 801(d)(3). 
 154. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 38.071 (2007) (Texas videotaping 
statute admitting the result of a child interview by a neutral investigator). 
 155. Where a victim is available to testify, corroborating hearsay might be 
allowed under the first report exception, or if the victim’s story is impugned, 
under the prior consistent statement theory. It is where victims are unavailable 
due to absence, age, or trauma that a videotaped statement might be most 
helpful. 
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Furthermore, the statutory prerecorded statement exception is most 
likely to be used when the victim is available on videotape in a 
controlled and prepared setting, but unavailable in the courtroom 
because of the trauma of live testimony.156 Under the current law, the 
standard of availability for cross-examination is low, and courts are 
lenient in allowing prosecutors to introduce videotaped testimony.157 
Nonetheless, it is unclear whether this lenient standard should allow the 
admission of such psychologically powerful testimony.158 Under the 
“primary purpose” test announced in Davis,159 videotaped testimony 
would be testimonial because the purpose of the interview is to prepare 
the statement for trial. It seems likely that the Confrontation Clause 
requires that, when presenting the videotaped testimonial statements of 
a young child under 801(d)(3), the child must be available for cross-
examination about the statements and the circumstances of their 
making; otherwise, they should be deemed inadmissible. 
E. The First Complaint Doctrine 
The first complaint exception to the hearsay rule evolved from the 
original “hue and cry” doctrine of the English common law.160 This 
doctrine presupposed that a victim of violent crime would immediately 
cry out and alert her neighbors that she had been assaulted.161 This 
theoretically allowed neighbors and friends to search for the aggressor 
and dispelled any notion that the victim was complicit in the crime.162 
 
 156. See Vaska v. State, 135 P.3d 1011, 1021 n.50 (Alaska 2006). The court 
noted that at the defendant’s original trial the victim was “so terrified of 
appearing as a witness that she hid under a table in the court building’s law 
library and could not be convinced to come out, or even to communicate, despite 
repeated entreaties by the prosecuting attorney.” Id. 
 157. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988). The Confrontation 
Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not successful 
cross-examination. Id. A witness has “appeared for cross-examination” for 
Confrontation Clause purposes if he has taken the stand and willingly answered 
questions, even if he has no recollection of the facts underlying the prior 
statement and minimal recollection of making the prior statement. Id. at 559–60. 
 158. For a discussion of the complexity of the right to effective cross-
examination, see Lisa Kern Griffin, Circling around the Confrontation Clause: 
Redefined Reach but not a Robust Right, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 16, 19–
20 (2006), available at http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/ 
vol105/griffin.pdf. 
 159. 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006); see also supra notes 144 to 148 and accompanying 
text. 
 160. 4 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1134 (James H. 
Chadbourn ed., 1972) [hereinafter 4 WIGMORE] (explaining the original purpose 
of the “hue and cry” in English common law). 
 161. New Jersey v. Hill, 578 A.2d 370, 374 (N.J. 1990). 
 162. Id. 
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The doctrine gradually fell out of favor for most violent crimes, as it 
proved generally ineffective in leading to the aggressor’s apprehension, 
and even one complicit in the crime could raise the cry.163 However, its 
importance in rape and sexual assault prosecutions increased as the 
primary purpose of the “hue and cry” evolved from a method of 
facilitating an aggressor’s capture to a method of dispelling any 
suspicion that a victim had fabricated assault charges.164 Under this 
doctrine, evidence of a victim’s complaint was fully admissible as 
substantive evidence and was an important part of the State’s case-in-
chief, rebutting the presumption that if no complaint was made, then no 
violence had been committed.165 
During the early 1800s, as evidence rules were developed and the 
prohibition against hearsay gained importance, complaints still 
admitted under the “hue and cry” tradition became suspect and courts 
enforced a somewhat more stringent fresh complaint rule.166 The rule 
admitted evidence that a victim had made a “fresh complaint”—a 
complaint made shortly after the incident167—but excluded most of the 
details of the complaint, including identification of the assailant, and 
prevented the testimony from being used to show that an assault 
actually occurred.168 The evidence of the complaint was admitted for the 
sole purpose of forestalling the “natural assumption”169 that if a woman 
had not complained to someone, then she had not been harmed.170 
Courts have applied this principle to require that the victim of a crime 
must testify, since the testimony’s sole purpose is to repel the 
inconsistency between the victim’s current testimony and former 
silence.171 
The Alaska Supreme Court initially recognized the first complaint 
exception to the hearsay rule in a footnote in Torres v. State.172 In 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 160, § 1134.  
 166. Hill, 578 A.2d at 375. 
 167. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 160, § 1135. 
 168. Hill, 578 A.2d at 375. 
 169. 4 WIGMORE, supra note 160, § 1135. 
 170. Id. The evidence was admitted during the prosecution’s case in chief, and 
in the process it preemptively negated evidence not yet introduced by the 
opponent. Wigmore explained this apparent paradox: “[T]his process is regular 
enough in reality, because the impression upon the tribunal would otherwise be 
there as if the opponent had really offered evidence of the woman’s silence.” Id. 
 171. Id. § 1136. 
 172. 519 P.2d 788, 793 n.9 (Alaska 1974). In that case, an eight-year-old victim 
had complained of a sexual assault to her mother five to ten minutes after the 
occurrence. While the court admitted the statement as an excited utterance, it 
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Greenway v. State, the court more clearly defined and applied the 
exception.173 Harold Greenway was convicted of raping his thirteen-
year-old stepdaughter in July 1978.174 According to the victim, 
Greenway threatened to kill her if she told anyone about the rape.175 
Three days after the assault, she allegedly mentioned the incident to her 
mother, but the mother misinterpreted the conversation and took no 
action.176 When school started in September, the victim reported the rape 
to her high school counselor.177 The trial court allowed the testimony of 
both the mother and the counselor.178 
The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision to 
admit testimony from the mother and the counselor, applying the 
exception it first acknowledged in Torres.179 The court noted: 
In a prosecution for a sex crime, such as rape or assault with 
intent to rape, it may be shown by testimony of the prosecutrix 
or by that of some other witness, that the prosecutrix made 
complaint of the crime shortly after its commission. Such 
evidence tends obviously to indicate the truth of the charge and 
is corroborative thereof; conversely, evidence of the failure to 
make a prompt complaint casts doubt upon the truth of the 
claim that a crime had been committed.180 
The court failed to further explain its reasoning, leaving application 
of the principle to lower courts’ understanding of the Wigmore and 
Wharton evidence texts. The court did indicate in a footnote that the 
exception would allow only the admission of the fact of a complaint, but 
not the details of that complaint.181 It also admitted the statement despite 
the one-month delay between the assault and the victim’s conversation 
with her guidance counselor, finding that the delay was explained by 
the victim’s age and Greenway’s threats.182 In doing so, the court held 
that delay in reporting does not necessitate excluding a complaint, but 
 
noted that the statement might also be admissible under the fresh complaint 
doctrine. Id. at 790–97. 
 173. 626 P.2d 1060 (Alaska 1980). 
 174. Id. at 1060. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 1060–61 (quoting 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 313 (Charles 
E. Torcia ed., 13th ed. 1972)). 
 181. Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1061 n.4. 
 182. Id. at 1061. 
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rather is a factor that may be considered in weighing the complainant’s 
testimony.183 
The rule set out in Greenway continues the gradual evolution of the 
fresh complaint doctrine. Although the fact that an assault had taken 
place is admissible during the prosecution’s case-in-chief to corroborate 
the victim’s testimony and repel any assumption that might be inferred 
from a victim’s silence, under Greenway, the details of the assault and the 
identification of the perpetrator are not admissible.184 The decision 
relaxed the traditional freshness requirement, and indicated that a 
statement’s timing was not dispositive, but rather only one factor in 
determining a victim’s credibility.185 
The Greenway court’s first complaint rule was altered by the court 
of appeals’s decision in Nitz v. State.186 There, the court of appeals 
considered the case of a stepfather accused of abusing his stepdaughter 
from the time she was seven until she reached eleven.187 Under 
Greenway, the trial court in Nitz admitted testimony by the child’s 
mother that the victim had said that “daddy” had been bothering her; 
testimony by an officer who interviewed the child the day after her 
accusations; and testimony by another officer who had received a more 
detailed version of the events from the victim more than four months 
after the initial accusations.188 The court of appeals held that the 
Greenway rationale applied only to the first complaint of sexual assault 
and could therefore be invoked to admit the statements made to the 
victim’s mother, but not those made to the police officers.189 The court 
also noted a “marked trend” in other jurisdictions towards relaxation of 
the first complaint rule’s prohibition against the admission of details.190 
Therefore, the court held that details of the complaint, including the 
identity of the assailant, were admissible “within the reasonable limits of 
the trial court’s discretion . . . .”191 
 
 183. Id.; see also Commonwealth v. King, 834 N.E.2d 1175, 1197 (Mass. 2005) 
(citing Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1061).  
 184. Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1060–61. This interpretation comes from the 
WHARTON text quoted in the Greenway and Torres opinions. See supra note 109. 
 185. Id. 
 186. 720 P.2d 55 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
 187. Id. at 58. 
 188. Id. at 59. 
 189. Id. at 62. 
 190. Id. at 63. “In recent years, there has been a marked trend toward 
relaxation of the traditional restrictions governing admission of evidence of the 
victim’s first complaint.”See also Michael H. Graham, The Cry of Rape: The Prompt 
Complaint Doctrine and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 489, 
502–06 (1983). 
 191. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 63. 
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The first complaint rule has served an important purpose in child 
sexual abuse cases. Unfortunately, its utility is hampered by both its 
limitation to testifying declarants and its somewhat inconsistent 
application by Alaska courts. First, courts have applied the first 
complaint exception only when a victim testifies.192 In child abuse cases, 
this potentially disqualifies reliable statements made by victims who are 
too young or otherwise unable to appear in court.193 
Second, application of the Greenway rule has in some respects been 
inconsistent. In Greenway, the court allowed two witnesses to testify 
under the first complaint doctrine.194 Nitz, in contrast, noted that the rule 
permitted only one witness to testify.195 Relaxing the details requirement 
“for the purpose of enabling the jury to obtain a fair understanding of 
the circumstances under which the complaint was made”196 has also 
resulted in confusion. Some cases have allowed an abuser’s identity to 
be revealed along with other details of a complaint; others have not. 197 
The shortage of concrete applications on these issues further indicates 
 
 192. Ryan v. State, 899 P.2d 1371, 1378 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995) (The court 
noted that “because the rationale of the ‘first complaint’ exception is to 
corroborate the victim’s testimony, the State can rely on this exception only 
when the victim testifies.” The court held that because the victim had not 
testified at grand jury and could not testify at trial, her statements could not be 
admitted under the “first complaint” hearsay exception.); see also 4 WIGMORE, 
supra note 160, § 1136. 
 193. See, e.g., Broderick v. King’s Way Assembly of God Church, 808 P.2d 
1211 (Alaska 1991). In Broderick, the Alaska Supreme Court held an unavailable 
three-year-old victim’s statements reliable for purposes of the residual hearsay 
exception. Id. at 1220. Factors indicating reliability included the age of the victim, 
childish terminology, and lack of a motive to lie. Id. at 1218–20. 
 194. Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1061 (Alaska 1980). 
 195. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 62 (noting that “the Greenway rationale applies, by 
definition, only to the first complaint of sexual assault . . . .”); see also Thompson 
v. State, 769 P.2d 997 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989) (the trial court admitted the victim’s 
hearsay statements to numerous individuals under Greenway, but the court of 
appeals noted that only the initial report should have been admitted under the 
rule), Vandiver v. State, 726 P.2d 195 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (the trial court 
admitted the statement of both a social worker and a police officer under the 
Greenway rule; the court of appeals reversed, holding that only the social 
worker’s statement could qualify as a first complaint). 
 196. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 63. 
 197. Compare Russell v. State, 934 P.2d 1335 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997) (testimony 
about the details of the complaint were either admissible or harmless error) with 
Thompson, 769 P.2d at 1001 (“Greenway does not allow a detailed description of 
the complaining witness’ allegations, the case permits only evidence of the fact 
of the complaint and the circumstances under which it was made.”), and Horton 
v. State, 758 P.2d 628 (three friends were allowed to testify to the initial 
complaint but were not permitted to provide details of the complaint). Greenway 
does not allow a detailed description of the complaining witness’ allegations, 
but permits only evidence of the fact of the complaint and the circumstances 
under which it was made. Greenway, 626 P.2d at 1060–61. 
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why lower courts have had difficulty applying the exception as it 
currently stands.198 
The problems associated with each of these current methods for 
introducing hearsay statements in the case-in-chief demonstrates the 
necessity of a new exception that meets the unique needs of child sexual 
abuse prosecutions. 
IV.  PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE ALASKA RULES OF EVIDENCE 
The first complaint exception to the hearsay rule offers Alaska rule- 
and policymakers a logical method for balancing the necessity of 
hearsay with the rights of defendants.199 A codified exception would 
eliminate the current first complaint rule’s uneven application in child 
sexual abuse cases, prevent judicial wrangling of the excited utterance 
and residual hearsay exceptions, and supplement the current exception 
for medical records and recorded statements. The rule can be crafted in 
the format of existing Rule 801(d), and read as follows: 
Rule 801(d)(4)—Statements That Are Not Hearsay: 
The following definitions apply under this article: 
(d)  Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not 
hearsay if 
(4)  The statement is a first complaint of sexual abuse offered 
by a child under the age of 12 and 
(a)  The declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross 
examination concerning the statement or 
(b)  The declarant is unavailable as a witness under ARE 
804(b)(1–4) and 
   (1) the statement is made to a family member, friend, 
acquaintance, school employee, or medical caretaker not in 
the course of a criminal investigation, or 
 
 198. Compare D.G. v. State, 754 P.2d 1128 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (holding that 
revealing the identity of the accuser invalidated a first complaint), with 
Nusunginya v. State, 730 P.2d 172 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) (admitting the identity 
of the accused in a first complaint),. 
 199. See Joel Michael Cohen, Nitz v. State: Skewing the Evidentiary Rules to 
Prosecute Child Molesters, 4 ALASKA L. REV. 333 (1987). Cohen recognizes the 
problems Nitz and its progeny created in the application of the first complaint 
rule, and he proposes an exception to the rule against hearsay “that would allow 
the out-of-court statement of prompt complaint by a child victim of sexual abuse 
under the age of ten to be admitted at trial, so long as the testimony is strictly 
limited to the existence of the complaint, and the time and place where it was 
made.” Id. at 357. 
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   (2) the statement is made to a government official where 
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police 
assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. 
Under this proposed exception, an alleged abuse victim’s first 
complaint of sexual abuse would be admissible as substantive evidence 
on direct examination. The amendment continues the evolution of the 
Greenway first complaint rule by fully removing the freshness 
requirement and allowing any initial complaint. Admitting all initial 
complaints counteracts the outdated assumption that abuse victims will 
immediately cry out, while still allowing the jury to weigh the delay in 
determining credibility.200 
Furthermore, the rule comports with the reality of sexual abuse 
prosecutions by admitting the details of the complaint, including the 
identity of the accused. This eliminates any inconsistencies in applying 
the details standard and corresponds with the changes that have already 
occurred in many jurisdictions.201 Permitting the details of the complaint 
also gives the fact-finder a more thorough understanding of the relevant 
context and circumstances.202 
Subsection (b) of the proposed exception alters the longstanding 
first complaint requirement that the victim must testify. Subsection 
(b)(1) would allow an unavailable child witness’s statements to be 
admitted, provided the statement was made to family members, 
acquaintances, or school or medical personnel when no crime is being 
investigated. These are the statements most likely given in response to 
non-leading questions and are most likely to rely on the speaker’s free 
recall. Subsection (b)(2) makes admissible statements made to police 
officers or social workers in the course of an investigation, if such 
statements helped government officials respond to an ongoing 
emergency. The addition of these subsections is important in child 
hearsay cases because children are often unavailable to testify due to 
young age, memory loss, or stress. It ensures that statements retracted 
out of love or fear when the defendant is someone who is close to the 
child are still admitted when the evidence is reliable. 
The change does not affect the historical purpose of the rule, which 
is to corroborate the victim’s claim of sexual abuse. Studies show that 
 
 200. Emery v. State, No. A-7799, No. 4608, 2002 Alas. App. LEXIS 198 (Alaska 
Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2002). In Emery, expert testimony: (1) explained that it is 
common for a child not to first report in-family sexual abuse to the non-abusing 
parent, (2) noted the reasons a child may delay reporting sexual abuse, and (3) 
explained why it is common for a child to disclose sexual abuse during a 
separate family crisis. Id. at *5. 
 201. Nitz v. State, 720 P.2d 55, 63 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986). 
 202. Id. 
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most children’s accusations of sexual abuse are accurate;203 a victim’s 
inability to testify does not necessarily diminish the validity of his or her 
claim. Hearsay evidence that would be admitted under this rule 
provides corroboration and support for a victim’s statements even in 
cases where the victim does not testify. 
The altered rule would help alleviate the tendency of some courts 
to stretch the excited utterance exception or to over-aggressively use the 
residual hearsay exception to admit initial complaints of child sexual 
abuse. Under the proposed rule, first complaint evidence can be 
admitted substantively, removing the need to use other exceptions when 
the victim is unavailable to testify. The rule would not eliminate 
admission based on other exceptions. Subsequent complaints could still 
be admitted as excited utterances, prior consistent statements, medical 
records, or under the residual exception, but they would be required to 
legitimately meet the criteria of those exceptions. 
While the proposed exception loosens the restrictions on hearsay in 
sexual abuse trials, it does so in a manner that is fair to criminal 
defendants. The proposed rule allows testimony of the details of the 
complaint, but also limits admission to a victim’s first complaint. This 
will provide context that may clarify a child’s accusations. More 
importantly, the exception provides a definite rule for admissibility, 
preventing prosecutors from producing witnesses who repeat similar 
statements by the victim that add little substance “but the force of 
repetition.”204 For example, in Greenway, the child victim “sounded the 
alarm” when she complained of abuse to her mother.205 The statement to 
her mother was the first complaint and would have been admissible 
under the proposed rule. However, the victim’s later statements to her 
guidance counselor would not have been admitted. Such a scenario does 
not unduly prejudice the defendant because the adult to whom the child 
initially complains will have little reason to ask leading questions or to 
interpret the child’s statements as accusations of abuse unless they 
clearly are. Testimony from such a conversation will, therefore, 
generally be based on the child’s free recall and increase the likelihood 
that the accusations are reliable. 
The proposed rule also complies with the Confrontation Clause. 
Most first complaints by children, even those containing explicit details 
and the identity of the accuser, are likely to be nontestimonial in nature 
under the criteria set forth in Davis and Crawford. The initial complaint is 
the one most necessary to avert the emergency and keep the child from 
 
 203. GOVERNOR’S REPORT, supra note 13. 
 204. Nitz, 720 P.2d at 61. 
 205. Greenway v. State, 626 P.2d 1060, 1060 (Alaska 1980). 
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danger. A question by a parent, doctor, or other private individual will 
almost always precede questioning by a police officer or other agent of 
the state.206 From the child’s point of view, the statements are often 
spontaneous responses to a question from a parent, more similar to a 
“casual remark to an acquaintance” than an accusation.207 The intent or 
purpose of the person who receives the statement, especially if the 
individual is a family member or friend, also likely indicates that the 
statements are nontestimonial.208 Such persons are almost always 
motivated by a desire to improve the child’s well-being or to end the 
abuse, rather than to investigate a crime. The questioning is also unlikely 
to be formalized with a specific intent to elicit accusations. Furthermore, 
specifying that nontestimonial statements are admissible allows judges 
the discretion to evaluate individual statements under the factors 
defined in Davis. 
CONCLUSION 
Current approaches to admitting children’s statements in sexual 
abuse cases are inconsistent, and sometimes run into problems with the 
reinvigorated right to confrontation developed by the Supreme Court in 
Crawford and Davis. A new, codified exception to the hearsay rules based 
on the current first complaint exception will not resolve all of the 
difficulties of prosecuting child sexual abuse in Alaska. However, it can 
increase the fairness of these prosecutions, and help facilitate 
compliance with the Confrontation Clause. Crawford and Davis focused 
application of the Confrontation Clause on the prohibition of testimonial 
statements. The Court has not yet applied this new paradigm in a child 
abuse case. However, the approach has been consistently applied by 
lower courts to allow children’s statements to parents, friends, and 
medical personnel. Since most first complaints are made to these private 
individuals and not to police officers, much evidence admissible under 
the first complaint exception will be regarded as nontestimonial and 
therefore admissible. The exception proposed here recognizes both the 
 
 206. People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 920–21 (Colo. 2006) (admitting statements 
made to a child’s father and father’s friend because they were made to private 
individuals and were “not solemn or formal statements”); see also Crawford v. 
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.7 (2004) (noting the framers’ concern for the 
“involvement of government officers in the production of testimony with an eye 
toward trial . . . .”). 
 207. In re Rolandis G., 817 N.E. 2d 183, 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (quoting 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51) (finding that the victim’s statements to his mother were 
not testimonial because they were similar to a “‘casual remark to an 
acquaintance’”). 
 208. Mosteller, supra note 77, at 947. 
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reliability and necessity of child hearsay testimony and the importance 
of protecting defendants’ rights to confront their accusers. It represents 
an additional tool to help deal with the difficulties of prosecuting child 
sexual abuse in Alaska. 
 
